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Abstract
The last decade has experienced a vivid enthusiasm to unravel the mystery of consciousness believed to be one of the major puzzles of human
kind. We share this enthusiasm. Still, we feel that current models are incomplete suffering from a problem that we call the “small network
argument”.
c© 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Not even twenty years ago, consciousness has been widely
considered a scientifically non-tractable issue. This view has
greatly changed. In the last decade, a variety of brain processes
has been proposed to account for consciousness. Typical
examples are recurrent computations (e.g. Grossberg (1999)
and Lamme (2006)), synchronized or oscillating neural activity
(e.g. Bachmann (1994), Engel, Fries, Konig, Brecht, and
Singer (1999) and Llinas, Ribary, Contreras, and Pedroarena
(1998)), winner-take-all computations stabilized in resonance
with the presynaptic neurons (Grossberg, 1999) or across
the typical time span of working memory (Taylor, 1998),
and closed loop action–perception processing (e.g. O’Regan
and Noe (2001)). For example, recent physiological (Lamme,
1995) and psychophysical (e.g. Di Lollo, Enns, and Rensink
(2000)) research has, indeed, suggested the importance
of recurrent processing for consciousness, e.g. suppressing
recurrent processing extinguished consciousness (e.g. Lamme
(1995, 2006)). These findings are in good accordance with
previous modelling studies proposing that all conscious states
are resonant states1 that stabilize over a time scale of a few
hundred milliseconds (Grossberg, 1999; Taylor, 1998).
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1 Note that Grossberg emphasizes that the inverse statement ‘is not yet
asserted’.
Whereas the theoretical and empirical results of these studies
are of great importance, we propose that current models
cannot fully account for consciousness because of a problem,
we call the small network argument: For each of the above
models, a very small neural network exists that fulfills the
respective characteristics of the models but does not exhibit
consciousness.
For example, two neurons, mutually interconnected, make
up a recurrent system. Hence, these two neurons must create
consciousness if recurrence is sufficient for consciousness
(e.g. Lamme (2006)). Minimal models of winner-take-all
computations require only three “competing” neurons which
are fully connected to three presynaptic input neurons, plus
potentially a single neuron controlling vigilance (Grossberg,
1999). Hence, such a network of seven neurons is sufficient
to develop resonant states allowing learning (Grossberg, 1999)
and working memory (Taylor, 1998). Analogously, if neural
oscillations or synchrony are the main characteristics of
consciousness, then, a group of three interconnected neurons
firing in synchrony is conscious. Similarly, a thermostat,
typically modelled as a single control loop between a
temperature sensor (‘perception’) and an on–off switch for a
heater (‘action’), is a classical example of a perception–action
device. It can be formulated as a two-neuron feedforward
network with a sensory neuron connecting onto an output
neuron controlling the heater switch.
If one does not want to attribute consciousness to such
small networks other components are needed. For this reason,
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additional characteristics are, often implicitly, proposed to be
necessary for consciousness. Typical examples are attention,
cognition, the number of neurons, or the complexity of the
network. Let us discuss these ideas in turn.
O’Regan and Noe (2001) combined their “sensomotor
contingency” approach of perception with a work space like
model (e.g. Newman, Baars, and Cho (1997)). Perception
occurs in a closed loop of action and information processing.
Consciousness emerges when attention and planning come into
the play. For example, most of the normal car driving occurs
in an automatic, unconscious mode. Conscious perception,
e.g. of a traffic sign, emerges only if route planning and,
hence, attention becomes important. Still, attention can be
integrated within a small network just by adding one extra input
arising from a second group of neurons (e.g. Hamker (2004))—
containing potentially a very small number of cells.
Results from classical artificial intelligence have shown
that invoking cognition does also not solve the small network
problem either. For example, a basic calculator (or a universal
computer running a program of only a few lines) outperforms
most humans when it comes to computing the square root
of 2 and it does so presumably without consciousness.
Moreover, there are psychophysical indications that attention
and cognition can occur without consciousness in human
beings (e.g. Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Cornelisse, and Lamme
(2007), Kiefer and Brendel (2006), Mattler (2005) and Scharlau
and Ansorge (2003)).
Instead of attention and cognition, it is often proposed
that consciousness emerges if a brain exceeds a certain
number of neurons. However, let us suppose a model with
a linear arrangement of neurons in which each neuron is
connected to its neighbor to the right and left only. Given
its simple connectivity, there is no obvious reason to assume
that such a network, say, with 1010 neurons is more capable
to create consciousness than its simplest version consisting
of only three neurons. Hence, the sheer number of neurons
alone is inadequate to overcome the small network argument.
Therefore, other approaches state that a certain complexity
of the connectivity of the network has to be met to yield
consciousness. For example, Tononi and Edelman (1998)
proposed to measure complexity by defining a functional
cluster which is loosely connected to the rest of the network
and has a rich repertoire of internal states. Still, even in this
case we can construct a small network of, say, nine neurons, that
meets the proposed complexity criterion.2 Hence, the necessary
2 This network is organized in three clusters of three neurons each and weak
connections between the three groups. The functional cluster index (Tononi &
Edelman, 1998) takes high values if connections between the three neuronal
groups are chosen arbitrarily small. Moreover, in a neuron model we may
assign to each neuron n activity states (e.g., different firing rates or temporal
patterns) and a suitable interaction dynamics on the time scale of hundreds of
milliseconds. Suppose the following formal model of interaction: The state of
each neuron is described by p bits, hence there are 2p possible states. During
the first time step of 100 milliseconds, the three neurons in a functional cluster
agree on the first bit by a majority vote; in the following 50 milliseconds on the
second bit, and during the final 200/2p milliseconds on the pth bit. Hence, for
any arbitrary p, the three neurons within the cluster will have agreed on p bits
in less than 200 milliseconds leading to a high index of neural complexity.
ingredients of the theory of Tononi and Edelman (1998) can be
implemented in a surprisingly small network.
We do not doubt that attention, recurrent computations, and
complexity are important aspects to understand consciousness.
However, we propose that these aspects are often trivially nec-
essary rather than sufficient.3 For example, often it is assumed
that consciousness emerges not before several hundreds mil-
liseconds after stimulus onset (e.g. Castiello, Paulignan, and
Jeannerod (1991), Grossberg (1999), Libet, Gleason, Wright,
and Pearl (1983) and Scharnowski et al. (2007), Taylor (1998)).
Hence, given the short time constants of membranes of neurons,
recurrent connections are obviously necessary to store and pro-
cess the stimulus before consciousness is reached. Complex-
ity is for sure of primary importance for consciousness because
networks with the same number of neurons can create trivial
as well as complex behavior depending on their connectivity.4
Therefore, the important question is which kind of connectivity
or which exact degree of complexity, determined with which
mathematical norm, is sufficient for consciousness and why
(but see Moody (2003))?
A rather different way to cope with the small network
argument is to claim that, indeed, each small network has some
kind of (almost vanishing) consciousness (e.g. Lamme (2006)).
It is evident that such kind of “panpsychism” (cf. Globus
(1976)) encounters serious problems as well. Consider, for
example, two non-connected systems with three neurons each
and each system having its own consciousness. What happens
when these two systems are connected? Does one unified
consciousness emerge, do the two consciousness’ stay separate
independent of each other (as proposed in split brain patients),
or are there new coalitions of neurons making up new
(micro)consciousness’ (e.g. Zeki (2003))? In the later cases,
there can be as many consciousness’ at a given time as
there are, for example, recurrent connections, synchronizations,
or winner-take-all competitions. In short, it is by far not
obvious why an increase in “conscious” elements yields one
unity consciousness, we experience, and not many separate
consciousness’.
We think that similar considerations hold also for other
approaches not mentioned above linking consciousness, for
example, to NMDA synapses (Flohr, 1992), to the biological
tissue per se (Searle, 1992), and to metarepresentations
(e.g. HOT: Rosenthal (1997); HOLT: Rolls (1997)).
In summary, we have argued that for each model of
consciousness there exists a minimal model, i.e., a small
neural network, that fulfills the respective criteria, but to
which one would not like to assign consciousness. Appeals to
additional aspects, such as the size or complexity of the network
3 Precisely, they are part of a minimal sufficient condition for consciousness,
whereby a condition is minimal sufficient iff none of its parts is redundant.
However, they do not constitute a sufficient condition on their own. Something
has to be added.
4 Any kind of mathematical asymptotic behavior, i.e. stable fixed points,
oscillations, and chaos, can be created with a network of three neurons
where each neuron is described by a single nonlinear differential equation
(e.g. Pasemann (2002)) and even by a single neuron model with three
differential equations, as in the Hindmarsh and Rose (1984) model.
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are obviously necessary but not sufficient to ‘explain’ how
consciousness emerges. The above considerations should in no
way hinder the exciting research on modelling consciousness.
We do not claim that consciousness is a scientifically intractable
problem in principle as some philosophers do (see notably
Chalmers (1996) for an ontological and Levine (1983) for
an epistemic argument). Quite to the contrary, we postulate
that consciousness is accessible to natural science. We suggest
to consider the small network argument as a benchmark any
model of consciousness has to meet. In the past, benchmarks
have helped strongly to structure research areas. For example,
benchmark data sets have provided clear standards in machine
learning. We suggest the small network argument to be a
starting point for a set of benchmarks that may help to frame
the problem of consciousness. However, at the current state,
we do not see how computational approaches can escape the
“small network argument” without appealing to unspecific or
even mysterious forces.
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